Legitimate Rule in the European Union. The Academic Debate by Schimmelfennig, Frank
TÜBINGER ARBEITSPAPIERE ZUR INTERNATIONALEN
POLITIK UND FRIEDENSFORSCHUNG
Nr. 27
Frank Schimmelfennig
Legitimate Rule in the European Union
The Academic Debate
© F. Schimmelfennig, Tübingen 1996
Redaktion: Andreas Hasenclever, Thomas Nielebock, Volker Rittberger
Table of Contents
Introduction: The Problem of Legitimacy in the European Union1.  
Standpoints
The Legitimate Democratic Order at the European Level
The Subject of Democracy1.  
Participation and Representation2.  
Decision-Making3.  
1.  
Standpoints on Democracy at the European Level
"Westphalian" Conservatism1.  
Collectivistic Reform2.  
Individualistic Reform3.  
2.  
The Legitimate Distribution of Authority Between Levels
The Degree of Centralization1.  
Forms of Federalism2.  
3.  
Standpoints on Authority Distribution4.  
2.  
Arguments and Backings
Backings and Theories of Legitimacy
Output Legitimacy1.  
Input Legitimacy2.  
1.  
3.  
TAP 27
http://www.uni-tuebingen.de/uni/spi/taps/tap27.htm (1 von 33) [27.03.2000 15:13:57]
Social Legitimacy3.  
Arguments about the Legitimate Order at the European Level
Arguments for Conservatism1.  
Arguments for Collectivistic Reform2.  
Arguments for Individualistic Reform3.  
2.  
Arguments about the Distribution of Authority Between Levels
Arguments for Europeanization1.  
Arguments for (Re-)Nationalization2.  
3.  
Theories of Legitimacy and Standpoints4.  
Suggestions for Further Debate and Research
Controversy: Individualism vs. Communitarianism1.  
Dilemma: Output Legitimacy vs. Social Legitimacy2.  
Competition3.  
4.  
Endnotes5.  
Bibliography6.  
1. Introduction: The Problem of Legitimacy in the
European Union [Endnote 1]
Since the beginning of the 1990s, observers of European international relations have been able to witness an
apparent ideological contradiction. On the one hand, the communist system collapsed in the Eastern part of the
continent as a result of its failure to successfully compete with the Western liberal democracies in the domains of
ideological attractiveness, economic performance and social welfare. Liberal democracy established itself as the
sole standard of legitimate rule for the entire European system. Although many of the post-Communist societies
in Eastern Europe do not meet this standard yet (and it is highly doubtful whether all of them will in the
foreseeable future), the standard itself is not questioned by any rival ideology. On the other hand, the signing of
the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU) in 1991 triggered an intense public debate about the legitimacy
of European political integration and popular opposition in many of the Western European countries, most visibly
in Denmark where the TEU was at first rejected by the electorate in a referendum in 1992. At the same time when
Western democracy had won its "international debate" with communism (cf. Schimmelfennig 1995), a
"democratic deficit" was discovered in one of the core regions of the triumphant system.
This apparently contradictory development provides evidence for a thorough restatement of the issue of legitimate
rule in the European international system. The basic ordering principle of the modern European (or
"Westphalian") system has been internal and external state sovereignty. Binding commitments may result from
agreements among states as legal equals, but there cannot be any supranational authority to issue and to enforce
legitimate rules pertaining to the external behavior of states or to their domestic affairs. Recent international
developments indicate that the modern interstate system is undergoing profound change. This change is described
as the evolution of either a "post-estphalian" or a "neo-mediaeval" system (Bull 1977; Zacher 1992). Processes
bound to undermine exclusive state sovereignty are the "dehierarchization of state-society relations" (Scharpf
1991: 622f.) and the globalization of many political issue-areas (both limiting the state's internal sovereignty) as
well as the transnationalization of foreign policy and the internationalization of governance (both limiting the
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state's external sovereignty). These processes are probably more advanced in Western Europe than in any other
region of the international system. European political integration is a novel and extraordinary development within
the international system: In contrast to other processes of political integration in modern European history, it is
neither an example of empire-building of the Napoleonic or Russi an/Soviet kind nor of nation-building of the
Italian or German type, but the voluntary and peaceful transfer of (parts of) the authority of established
nation-states to a multinational organization. To a far greater extent than other international organizations, the
European Union has crossed the boundary from horizontal (or anarchical) interstate cooperation to vertical (or
hierarchical) policy-making in a multi-level political system, in which the states are but one level of the polity (if
still the most important one).
Until the second half of the 1980s, the issue of legitimate rule could largely be evaded in this polity, because
European integration was limited to a few policy sectors and decision-making at the European level was based on
the consensus of the member state governments. The EC relied on "indirect legitimacy", based on its image as a
stronghold of democracy against the communist threat and "on the democratic traditions and practices of its
members" which were supposed to be in complete control of the integration process (Wallace 1993: 96f.).
Functional and consensual cooperation at the European level was widely held to leave democratic legitimacy at
the national level intact (cf. Scharpf 1993: 180).
Since the Single European Act (SEA) and the Treaty on European Union, however, the integration process has
made a "great leap forward". Several new policy sectors have been europeanized. The European Union has not
just become an internal market, it also possesses redistributive powers. In many issue-areas, such as agricultural
policy and policies connected with the internal market, political regulation eludes the control of the individual
member states and is subject to policy-making in sectoral multi-level networks composed of specialized national
and European interest-groups and bureaucracies (cf., e.g., Héritier 1993; Peters 1992; Schumann 1993). Areas
like foreign policy, border controls, and currency, which are supposed to belong to the core of state sovereignty,
have been put on the European agenda and may soon come under supranational authority. Moreover, both the
SEA and the TEU have expanded majority decision-making in the Council of Ministers. Consequently, Europe an
law has not only gone beyond the technical regulation of coordination problems for a small number of sectoral
policies, but it can also possess direct effect and supremacy over national law in states which did not consent to
them.
Under these circumstances, the Europeanization of policy-making could no longer be mainly based on indirect
legitimacy. The more power over issues of core state sovereignty and redistribution was transferred to the
European level, the more the Community was in need of its own sources of direct popular support. This has
become a salient political issue insofar as the long-time "permissive consensus" of the European societies toward
functional Europe an integration has been politicized and turned into widespread mistrust and skepticism toward
"Europe" as a result of "Maastricht" (cf. Reif 1993a; 1993b: 134). A European "legitimacy deficit" or even
"legitimacy crisis" was discovered, and it triggered a lively political and academic debate about the legitimate
order of the European Union.
In multi-level systems, two types of conflict about the legitimate order can emerge: (1) a dissensus about the
legitimating principles of rule at each level of the system, and (2) a dissensus about the legitimate distribution of
authority between the levels. As stated above, the issue of legitimate rule at the national level has been settled in
favor of liberal democracy for the time to come. Furthermore, there is a widespread consensus that the standard of
democracy is not confined to the realm of domestic rule but must also be applied to European policy-making. And
finally, it is almost generally agreed that the European Union in its current state does not meet this
standard.[Endnote 2]
The legitimacy deficit is commonly seen to originate from an "uneven denationalization" (Zürn 1992): The
transfer of political decisions and allocations from the national to the European level has weakened democratic
influence and control at the national level without having been compensated by equally strong democratic
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institutions and processes at the European level. The Council of Ministers, the representation of national
governments, legislates at the European level without being directly empowered in European affairs by the
national democratic constituencies and without being subjected to sufficient democratic control and
accountability.
Despite this consensus about the democratic norm and its deficient realization in the Europe an Union, there is
neither agreement on the exact nature of the violation of the democratic standard nor about the remedy for this
lack of legitimacy. This is mainly because "democracy" is underdetermined - in particular with regard to the
multi-level and multi-national European system of governance:
There are several historical and theoretical models of democracy (Held 1987) which lead to different
prescriptions for the best form of democratic rule.
1.  
There is no consensus about the normative criteria of legitimacy according to which "democracy" is
considered to be the most legitimate system. Neither does the literature agree on the empirical
prerequisities of a functioning democratic system. When it comes to democracy at the international level,
these normative and empirical criteria lead to different prescriptions for a European polity.
2.  
The standard theory of democracy presupposes a unitary nation-state and is silent about the specific
questions of legitimacy raised in multi-level, multi-national systems. It does not tell us anything about the
legitimate distribution of authority between the levels (if all levels are democratically ordered).
3.  
Finally, if democracy means "government by the people", it is far from obvious in a multi-national political
system who is "the people".
4.  
The aim of this paper is to give a systematic overview of the academic debate about legitimate rule in the
European Union. This overview is based on English and German language contributions which have been
published in the past five years, i.e. roughly since the signing of the TEU. In order to analyze the debate I use the
concepts of argumentation theory. According to the theory of argumentation, the basic situation of a debate can be
described as follows: A proponent P claims the validity of his standpoint s which is disputed by an opponent O. If
P wants to convince O of s, P has to offer an argument a. By putting forward a, P supposes that a is valid and
convincing ground for s. In other words, P claims not only that a is true in itself but also that the truth or rightness
of s can be inferred from a. This latter claim is called the "warrant" or "backing" b(a). This gives us the basic
argumentative formula "s because a according to b!".[Endnote 3] Such an analysis of the debate makes the
contributions to it comparable and reveals its structure.
The paper sets out with a classification of the standpoints taken in the debate on the legitimate European
multi-level system with regard to both legitimate rule at the European level and the distribution of competences
between levels (chapter 2). The arguments and backings put forward in support of these standpoints are analyzed
in chapter 3. Moreover, the paper points out the theoretical and empirical disputes behind the claims advanced. It
thus helps to pose the right questions for social research addressing the issue of a legitimate European
constitution, and to indicate what will have to be known in order to advance and, maybe, to settle the academic
debate.[Endnote 4] It is my observation that the main standpoints and arguments in the academic debate are on
the table and are being repeated over and over again. The focus of research should therefore shift to the
theoretical and empirical issues on which the contributions to the debate are based. Finally: Although the
European Union is certainly unique in its supranational authority, globalization and international governance
widely impinge upon the organization of the state. The European debate may therefore have general implications
for the "Third Transformation" of democracy (Dahl 1989: 317ff.).
The debate is mainly based on three controversial theories of democratic legitimacy:
The theory of output legitimacy claims that a political system obtains legitimacy by effectively and
efficiently realizing the citizens' goals and solving their problems. According to this theory, the democratic
order at the European level ought to maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of policy-making. This
1.  
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includes an important role for functional organizations and majoritarian decision-making. Competences
should be allocated to the level which is most capable of achieving a given goal and to solve a given
problem. Whereas it is agreed that this principle requires a competitive allocation of competences between
levels, the desirable degree of (de-)centralization is disputed among proponents of output legitimacy.
A political system achieves input legitimacy if the citizens possess political equality and if they effectively
participate in, and exercise control of, the political decisions. Accordingly, the democratic order at the
European level ought to maximize equal, direct, and effective citizen influence on European policy-making
and government accountability. This includes a strengthening of the European Parliament (EP) and
elements of direct democracy. The supreme authority should be allocated to the level at which political
equality, participation and accountability are best ensured.
2.  
According to the theory of social legitimacy, the legitimacy of a political order depends on the degree of
social homogeneity, the strength of civil society institutions, and the existence of a collective identity
among the citizens. Therefore, policy-making at the European level ought to protect the communities which
fulfill the conditions of social legitimacy: They are the subjects of democracy and must retain a maximum
of political autonomy. In the European Union, this theory requires consensual interstate decision-making
and the protection of national autonomy by an exclusive and minimal allocation of competences to the
Union.
3.  
The analysis of the argumentative constellations in the debate on legitimate rule in the European Union reveals
one fundamental controversy between individualism or cosmopolitanism on which input legitimacy is based and
communitarianism on which social legitimacy is based. I propose to transform this controversy into the empirical
question whether an individualistic and majoritarian liberal democracy requires a developed civil society, a high
degree of social homogeneity, and a collective identity of its citizens. By reference to the results of comparative
political studies, this question can be answered in the affirmative and in favor of social legitimacy. Since the
prerequisites of social legitimacy are only weakly developed at the European level, European governance ought to
be characterized by a high degree of inter-community power-sharing in the forms of consociationalism and
national autonomy.
This result emphasizes the major dilemma to be encountered in the debate, i.e. the dilemma between the
requirements of social legitimacy and of output legitimacy. In brief, it means that the requirements of social
legitimacy - high degrees of national autonomy and European consociationalism - can only be honored at the
expense of system capacity and effective political decision-making. There are two ways out of this dilemma:
Firstly, there is a dispute about the effectiveness and efficiency of centralized versus decentralized regulation. The
dilemma would disappear if it could be shown that decentralized competition between autonomous units was
indeed superior. Secondly, there is a dispute about the possibility of strengthening European civil society,
homogeneity, and collective identity. The dilemma would also disappear if it could be shown that strong and
democratic institutions at the European level would in turn create the lacking prerequisites of social legitimacy.
The analysis suggests that these are the core issues to be settled by further research.
2. Standpoints
In this section of the paper, I will present a classification of standpoints in the academic debate on the legitimacy
of the European Union. It has been inductively constructed on the basis of the very diverse views put forward in
the academic debate. In a first step, I deconstructed the usually multi-dimensional real standpoints into
one-dimensional (most often dichotomic) ones. Whereever possible, I related these one-dimensional standpoints
to classifications and categories proposed in the literature about democratic systems. The single-variable
classifications were then, in a second step, systematically recombined. I thus arrive not only at a reconstruction of
the standpoints taken in the debate, but also at a number of possible standpoints that have not been taken (at least
in the contributions to the debate I analyzed).[Endnote 5]
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2.1. The Legitimate Democratic Order at the European Level
2.1.1. The Subject of Democracy
The first and fundamental distinction of democratic orders at the European level results from the answer to the
question: "Who is the subject of democracy?" The basic dichotomy here is: the individual or some collective. This
distinction can also be found in the conceptualizations proposed by Archibugi/Held and
Bienen/Rittberger/Wagner.
Archibugi and Held (1995: 12) distinguish between cosmopolitan democracy and international democracy.
They define cosmopolitan democracy as "a model of political organization in which citizens, whereever
they are located in the world, have a voice, input and political representation in international affairs, in
parallel with and independently of their own governments" (13). By contrast, in "international democracy"
only states are represented at the supranational level.
l   
Bienen, Rittberger and Wagner (1996) distinguish between cosmopolitan and communitarian principles
with regard to the subject of democracy at the international level and, thus, already refer to the
philosophical background of the individual/collective dichotomy. Whereas cosmpolitans regard the
individual as the basic bearer of democratic rights, (democratic) communtarians regard the community as
the fundamental democratic entity possessing a value and rights of its own. The national community of the
state but also subnational (cultural, religious, ethnic etc.) communities qualify as subjects of international
democracy.
l   
If one looks for the simplest but nonetheless the most fundamental distinction of models of democracy at the
international level, this is it. However, it does not differentiate enough to capture the great diversity of positions
within either the individualistic or the collectivistic camp.
The next, immediately following question is: "Which individuals and which collectives are the subject of
democracy?" For the individualist position, this question is hardly posed any more. It is now commonly agreed in
Western democracies that men as well as women, above a certain age and regardless of their property, are
(formally) equal subjects of democracy. The one issue that is currently contested in many democratic countries is
the "inclusiveness of citizenship" (Boyce 1993: 459) with regard to alien residents: Should European residents,
who are not nationals of a EU member state, have democratic rights in the EU? However, this does not seem to be
an issue in the academic debate about legitimate rule in the European Union.
More controversial is the choice of the collectives which can legitimately claim to be the fundamental subjects of
democratic rule at the international level. The basic distinction here seems to be the one between territorial and
non-territorial collectives. The most important territorial collective, for which most claims of primacy are made,
is the nation, of course. However, in a multi-level system, the same claim can be advanced in favor of subnational
territorial communities, like the Canadian Provinces, the German Länder, or the Spanish Regions. The possible
variety of non-territorial collectives, which cut across territories or live as a scattered group in one territory, is
even more diverse: Gender, race, nationality/ethnicity, or religion are plausible non-territorial criteria for the
subjects of democracy which, however, do not seem to play a role in the debate about legitimate rule in the
European Union. The only non-territorial candidates for democratic subject status are functional collectives like
interest groups or, more generally, non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The classical example here is
(neo-)corporatist decision-making between the state, the employers' associatons and the trade unions.[Endnote 6]
2.1.2. Participation and Representation
Once the appropriate subject of democracy at the international level has been chosen, the next question is: "How
does the subject of democracy participate in politics?" Here, the basic answers are: directly or indirectly. They
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lead to one of the most common distinctions between models of democracy: direct democracy and representative
democracy.
Held (1987), in his comprehensive study of "models of democracy", also distinguishes these two broad
types: direct/participatory democracy, on the one hand, and liberal/representative democracy, on the other
(4). Within the liberal-democratic tradition, he distinguishes "two chief variants" (5) along the same lines:
Whereas protective democracy emphasizes the protection of the citizens "from the governors" by
representative and accountable government as well as legally circumscribed and divided state powers (70),
developmental democracy and its derivatives require the citizens' active participation in political life (102,
262).
l   
Held's models remain themselves firmly rooted in the individualistic model of democracy. And when we
distinguish between (elements of) direct and representative democracy, we usually mean decision-making by
referendum vs. decision-making by parliamentary vote (the members of parliament being themselves elected on a
one person/one vote basis). However, the direct-indirect continuum also makes sense for collectivistic
democracies. Both direct and representative modes of participation are possible if the subject of democracy at the
upper level of government is a collective. An example for the first mode is the procedure for reshaping the Länder
territories in the German federal system. It requires a referendum and a majority of votes in each of the territories
affected. An example for the second mode is senatorial representation - Wyoming elects the same number of
senators as does California. In addition, there are two more indirect forms of representation in collectivistic
democracies. One is parliamentary representation: Here, the lower-level entity is represented at the upper level
by members of its legislative - a common practice in Western international organizations like the Council of
Europe, NATO, and the WEU. The other form can be called executive representation. In this case, the
representatives of the collective at the upper level are delegated by the government of the collective. This is the
normal form of representation in international organizations. But it can also be found in Germany where the
second chamber does not consist of elected senators but of the representatives of the Länder governments.
2.1.3. Decision-making
The last major dimension on which models of democracy differ is the mode of decision-making. Two basic
answers can be given to the question: "How are democratic decisions to be made?" They are: by majority or by
consensus.
In very much the same way, Lijphart (1984) distinguishes between the Westminster or majoritarian model
and the consensus model of democracy, although these concepts are complex typologies built on a cluster
of variables.[Endnote 7] Some key characteristics of the majoritarian model are: the concentration of
executive power in one-party and bare-majority cabinets, the fusion of legislative and executive power with
cabinet dominance and a plurality system of elections (6ff.). By contrast, the consensus model "emphasizes
consensus instead of opposition, [...] includes rather than excludes, and [...] tries to maximize the size of the
ruling majority" (23). This model generally encourages the sharing and the dispersal of power and features
executive power-sharing, e.g. by grand coalitions, the separation of powers, and minority as well as
proportional representation (23ff.).
l   
A similar categorization can be found in Abromeit's (1993) study of systems of interest mediation. There,
the dichotomy is labeled competition and concordance.
l   
Since majoritarian and consensual decision-making can be combined with all the models of democracy mentioned
so far, I arrive at a taxonomy of 32 possible standpoints in the debate about the legitimate democratic order at the
European level of policy-making (Table 1). As is generally the case with abstract classifications, real-world
systems of democratic rule fall somewhat in between these categories. For example, in two-chamber
parliamentary systems, one is often based on individualism (like the French Assemblée Nationale, the German
Bundestag or the U.S. House of Representatives), the other on some sort of collectivism (like the French Sénat,
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the German Bundesrat or the U.S. Senate). Weighted representation (like the different number of deputies for
each country in the European Parliament) or weighted voting (like the different number of votes for the state
representatives in the German Bundesrat or the European Council of Ministers) also reflect a compromise
between the individualistic and collectivistic models of democracy.
Participation/Representation direct
indirect
individual
representation
parliamentary
representation
executive
representation
Subject Decision-making majoritarian consensual maj. con. maj. con. maj. con.
individualistic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
collectivistic
non-territorial functional 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
territorial subnational 17 18 19 21 21 22 23 24
national 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
Table 1: Standpoints in the Debate on the Legitimate Order at the European Level
Where would one locate the European system in this matrix? The European system of the Luxembourg Accord of
1966 [Endnote 8] was a clear Type-32 system, which is situated in the lower right corner of the table and most
strongly reflects a "Westphalian order" based on state sovereignty. Decisions were made consensually in the
Council of Ministers, where the member nations were represented by their governments. The SEA and the TEU
moved this system somewhat in the direction of a more individualistic, more direct and more majoritarian
democracy:
(a) On certain issues, the Council of Ministers returned to weighted and qualified majoritarian decision-making as
originally stipulated in the Treaties of Rome.
(b) The European Parliament, which features weighted individual representation and mainly majoritarian
decision-making, was not limited to a consultative role any more. Although its powers do not equal those of the
Council of Ministers, the cooperation and codecision procedures gave it some say in the European legislation
process. However, since the Council of Ministers with its state representatives dominates legislation, and since
majoritarian decision-making (if it takes place at all) is qualified, the European Union system is still
predominantly a collectivist democracy of the national kind with executive representation and a preference for
consensual decision-making.
2.2. Standpoints on Democracy at the European Level
Standpoints in the academic debate about the legitimate form of upper-level democracy can be subdivided
roughly into three categories: "Westphalian" conservatism, collectivistic reform and individualistic reform.
2.2.1. "Westphalian" Conservatism
Consensual interstate democracy (32):[Endnote 9] In the conservative perspective, the EU's recent moving away
from the "Westphalian" order of pure interstate democracy towards majority voting in the Council of Ministers
and EP co-decision is seen as having increased rather than diminished its democratic deficit (Weiler 1991: 413f.).
For the proponents of conservatism, the national government must remain the sole subject of democracy at the
European level. It represents the sovereign nation (as the basic democratic community) and is democratically
accountable to the national electorate and parliament. Legitimate policy-making at the European level is "to a
very large degree dependent on the consensus rule" (Kielmansegg 1994: 30). The model of democracy often
refered to by these authors is "consociationalism" (Lijphart), a system of concordance.
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For most proponents of consensual interstate democracy, the right level to address the democracy deficit of the
European Union is the national level. The lack of democratic empowerment and control of the national
governments should not be compensated by strengthening the European Parliament or introducing elements of
Europe-wide direct democracy. The legitimate remedy would be to strengthen the role of national parliaments
vis-à-vis national governments in European politics: "The 'Europeanization' of national parliaments promises
more democratization of European politics than a 'denationalization' of the European Parliament" (Lepsius 1991:
40).
2.2.2. Collectivistic Reform
Collectivistic reform of consensual interstate democracy can take three different general directions according to
the three dimensions of the democratic system distinguished here: interstate democracy with more majoritarian
decision-making; international democracy with more direct forms of representation; and intercollective
democracy with more disaggregated subjects.
Less Consensus
Majoritarian Interstate Rule (31): This is the standpoint which demands the least far-reaching reform in the
European system. It simply requires to replace the consensus principle of the Luxembourg Accord more generally
by majority decisions in the Council than heretofore.
Less Mediation
Parliamentary Representation (29, 30): Witte (1995: 137f.) suggests that the nations be represented by members
of the national parliament (instead of the national government) roughly proportional to the population size of the
country. She sticks to consensual decision-making in the Council (139) which would result in a Type-30 system.
Senatorial Representation (27, 28): Senatorial representation replaces territorial representation by governments
with territorial representation by directly elected senators for each member state. Zürn (1996: 50) proposes this
reform under the heading of "democratization of territorial representation" combined with majoritarian
decision-making (Type 27).
Less Aggregation
Regionalization (23, 24): Proponents of regionalization demand that the subjects of European democracy be not
(exclusively) the nation-states but (also) the regions, the sub-national territorial entities. For example, the
Committee of Regions created by the TEU could change from a mere consultative body to a full parliamentary
chamber in the European system (Boyce 1993: 474).
Functionalization (15, 16): In a functionalist perspective, non-governmental private or public interest groups are
regarded as legitimate subjects of European democracy (in addition to the state). The European interest group and
lobbying system is sometimes seen as an important contribution to representation and accountability at the
European level and, to some extent, as a functional equivalent of parliamentarism in this context
(Andersen/Eliassen 1996b: 54f.; Andersen/Burns 1996). Examples of this perspective are Evers' proposal to
strengthen the Economic and Social Committee of the EU, which up until now possesses a consultative function
only (1994: 127f.), and Zürn's (1996: 51) "transparent decision-making networks" in which NGOs should be
represented provided that they possess a democratic internal structure. Andersen and Burns demand that "we need
to explicate the concept of a citizenship of organizations, an organizational constitution, defining the role of
organizations in governance and providing explicit or public norms to regulate them" (1996: 248). Yet,
functionalization is never proposed as an exclusive reform strategy but usually in connection with the
strengthening of individualism at the European level.
2.2.3. Individualistic Reform
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Parliamentarization (3, 4): Together with "consensual interstate democracy", "parliamentarization" represents the
second major tendency in the academic debate on legitimate rule at the European level.[Endnote 10] Whereas
"consensual interstate democracy" is the normal type of international decision-aking between democratic states,
"parliamentarism" belongs to the fundamental principles of their domestic political systems. By contrast to the
standpoint of "consensual interstate democracy", "parliamentarization" considers the democracy deficit to be
rooted in the lack of influence of the individual voters and the lack of power of the European Parliament. It seeks
to strengthen the citizens' representation and parliamentary control at the European (and not only at the national)
level.[Endnote 11] Proponents of this standpoint view the changes introduced by the SEA and the TEU as first but
highly insufficient steps in the right directions of more individualism, more individual representation and more
majoritarian decision-making.
A rather moderate demand for parliamentarization proposes a (true) two-chamber system, in which the legislative
powers of the individualistic EP and the collectivistic Council are roughly equal. In accordance with the national
model, the Commission would then be elected by the EP.[Endnote 12] This can be termed federal
parliamentarization. By contrast, unitary parliamentarization demands a system in which individualist
democracy and individual representation clearly prevail over collectivism and executive representation. Witte
(1995: 137ff.), for instance, reduces the role of the Council (consisting of national parliamentarians, not of
government representatives!) to constitutional decisions and leaves day-to-day allocations to the EP alone.
Teutemann (1992: 335) sees no role whatsoever even for a reformed Council. All European legislation should rest
exclusively with directly elected parliamentary bodies.[Endnote 13]
Some of the proponents of parliamentarization accept the principle of weighted national representation (Classen
1994: 248; more implicitly, Witte 1995: 138) or weighted voting (Europäische Strukturkommission 1994: 44) as a
concession to collectivism.[Endnote 14] Others regard representation along national lines as inadmissible as the
fact that the UK did not go along with the European standardization of the election system.[Endnote 15]
In the order of more and more far-reaching individualistic reform, we can thus distinguish four types of
parliamentarization of the EU and name examplary proponents for each type:
(a) federal parliamentarization: equal two-chamber system with weighted representation in the EP (Bieber 1991;
Wieland 1991);
(b) moderately federal parliamentarization: equal two-chamber system with equal representation in the EP
(Europäische Strukturkommission 1994; Preuß 1995; Williams 1991);
(c) moderately unitary parliamentarization: EP dominance with weighted representation (Witte 1995); and
(d) unitary parliamentarization: EP dominance with equal representation (Teutemann 1992).
Direct Democratization (1, 2): By introducing the direct participation of the European citizens in Union affairs,
direct democratization goes beyond parliamentarization. "Europe-wide referenda" (Zürn 1996: 49) would
correspond to the classical form of direct democracy. They are favored by the "eurotopia" movement (Erne et al.
1995). "Citizen participation in the networks preparing and implementing EU policies" (Risse-Kappen 1996: 74)
seems to be complementary to a more functional view of European democracy. Petersmann (1991; 1993)
considers "additional substantive and procedural safeguards of the 'market freedoms' and fundamental rights of
EC citizens" (1991: 270) to be the most important element of direct democracy and gives the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) an important role in this respect (1993: 419f.). However, this is a rather peculiar, judicial and
defensive, perspective on "direct democracy".
It is obvious that many of the potential standpoints contained in Table 1 are not actually taken in the debate. The
largest cluster of purely "theoretical" standpoints can be found in the lower left quadrant of Table 1 which
combines direct democracy and collectivism. (A decision-making system based on separate referenda in all
member countries would fit there.) Table 2 summarizes the classification of reform strategies by which the
academic proposals described in this chapter were ordered:
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Table 2: Reform Strategies for the European Level
2.3. The Legitimate Distribution of Authority Between Levels
2.3.1. The Degree of Centralization
The second dissensus in multi-level systems is much easier to conceptualize. Most obviously, standpoints
concerning the legitimate distribution of authority between levels vary with regard to the degree of centralization.
If one assumes three distinct levels of governance in the European system, one arrives at three ideal-typical
standpoints. However, the "degree of centralization" is a continous variable, so that these three positions mark the
extreme values and a central value. Real-world standpoints will usually fall in between these values.
Supranationalism maximizes the centralization of competences. At its extreme, it demands a unitary
European government with no autonomy for national and sub-national units. However, a supranational
standpoint is also compatible with a federal system in which the federal (European) level is dominant. Such
a system is sometimes labeled a "unitarian federal state" and would be realized in a "United States of
Europe".
1.  
Nationalism defends the sovereignty of the centralized nation-state, the ideal-type of modern European
statehood. This standpoint demands that member states remain the "masters of the treaties", and that they
reserve at least the core political functions for themselves. It corresponds with the Gaullist or Thatcherite
vision of a "Europe des Patries".
2.  
Regionalism minimizes centralization. At its extreme, this position views Europe as an association of
quasi-sovereign subnational entities (Europe of Regions). At a minimum, regionalists demand greater
autonomy for the regional level and a greater say of regional governments in European politics.
3.  
2.3.2. Forms of Federalism
Two dichotomies of federal relationships are often referred to in the academic debate about the legitimacy of the
EU:
Scharpf (1994: 133) distinguishes a dual federalism based on the principle of separation (Trennprinzip)
from a cooperative federalism based on the principle of interconnection (Verbundprinzip). In dual
1.  
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federalism, there is no overlapping of governmental agencies across levels. For instance, national
governments only possess authority at the national level and do not participate in policy-making at the
supranational or regional level. According to Scharpf, U.S. federalism follows the principle of separation.
By contrast, German federalism belongs to the cooperative type. Here, policy-making is interconnected
between Länder and national governments or governmental agencies. Although policy-making is quite
highly centralized in Germany, the Länder governments are compensated by their own parliamentary body
at the national level (the Bundesrat) and by an important role in national legislation. However, this
dichotomy can be subsumed under the typology developed above: At the European level, the principle of
separation in dual federalism is congruent with individualistic systems in which lower-level governmental
bodies would be excluded from EU policy-making. The principle of interconnection is equivalent to
executive or parliamentary representation at the upper level.
The other dichotomy one often finds in the literature cannot be subsumed in this way. It concerns the
allocation of competences to the levels of government. Here, the basic distinction is between exclusive and
competitive allocation (see the ausschließliche and konkurrierende Zuständigkeiten in German
constitutional law). "Exclusive allocation" means that individual competences are clearly assigned to one
and only one level, whereas "competitive allocation" means that the allocation is open and variable in
principle.
2.  
This typology is too simple to classify the European system in more than a very rough and approximate way. It is
situated somewhere between supranationalism and nationalism and is based on competitive allocation in some
policy areas and on exclusive allocation in others. However, as in the case of the typology of legitimate
democratic orders at the European level, it helps to point at general directions of change and reform. Since the
mid-1980s, there is a clear tendency toward supranationalism. Most of it can be attributed to competitive
allocation of competences with regard to the completion of the internal market. Some of it is best viewed as the
transfer of exclusive competences to the European level: monetary union is the most obvious case here.
2.4. Standpoints on Authority Distribution
According to the typology developed above, five general directions of reform can be distinguished in the debate
about the legitimate distribution of authority and competences: centralization, i.e. Europeanization;
decentralization in two versions, i.e. Renationalization and Regionalization; More Competition, and More
Separation. It should be noted, however, that in the literature reviewed here, there was no proponent of
regionalization.
Competitive Europeanization
Demands for more centralization in the EU multi-level system usually go together with claims for competitive
allocation of competences. In his analysis of "rational competence distribution" in Europe, Teutemann (1992:
143) proposes a higher level of Europeanization than exists at the moment. Avowedly following the principle of
"subsidiarity", he advocates more strongly institutionalized international coordination and cooperation for policies
like foreign and defense policy, redistributive policies, home affairs, education and culture (285f.).[Endnote 16]
Competitive (Re-)Nationalization
The competitive allocation of competences is sometimes also proposed by authors who are against further
centralization and in favor of reserving the core of political functions for the nation-state. Kielmansegg (1994:
319) refers to the principle of "subsidiarity" in order to justify decentralization. Vaubel (1993) opposes
Europeanization for two different reasons: In general, he regards decentralized policy competition as the better
alternative. And in the few cases in which he accepts the superiority of centralization (foreign and security
policies), he views the EU region as the inadequate region of integration.
(Re-)Nationalization Through Exclusion
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Most other authors, who share the nationalist conviction, mistrust competitive allocation. They think that
competitive principles are too openly defined in order to prevent the expansion of supranationalism and to prevent
national competences from being successively eroded. Therefore, nationalists generally demand a clearcut
separation of competences between the levels and measures against the uncontrolled or sweeping transfer of
authority to the European level.[Endnote 17]
3. Arguments and Backings
3.1. Backings and Theories of Legitimacy
The "backings" or "warrants" on which the opponents in the debate about legitimate European rule base their
arguments can be grouped according to three fundamental ideas of political legitimacy: output legitimacy, input
legitimacy, and social legitimacy. As in the case of the standpoints on the legitimate political order at the
European level, these principles have been set up inductively on the basis of the contributions to the debate. They
have not been deduced from democratic theory but can be associated with the literature on the theory of
democracy. In the academic debate, these principles are used descriptively, i.e. as statements about the conditions
under which the European Union will be regarded as legitimate by its citizens, as well as normatively or
prescriptively. For this reason, they will also be referred to as "theories of legitimacy".
3.1.1. Output Legitimacy
The principle of output legitimacy is the basis of all arguments which rest on the backing of effectiveness and
efficiency. "Effectiveness" means the capacity of the political system to achieve the goals and to solve the
problems of the citizens; "efficiency" refers to its being able to do so at a reasonable cost.
(b1) The legitimacy of a political system depends on its capacity to achieve the citizens' goals and solve their
problems effectively and efficiently. The higher this capacity, the more legitimate the system.
Output legitimacy is at the core of technocratic or, more generally, utilitaristic theories of legitimate rule (cf.
Bogdandy 1993: 220). It emphasizes democracy as "government for the people" instead of "government by the
people". How the democratic process is organized, is secondary to what it achieves for the citizens. A system of
rule derives its legitimacy from its capacity; and it is democratic insofar as the output is in the interest of the
citizens. Dahl and Tufte define "system capacity" as the capacity of a polity "to respond fully to the collective
preferences of its citizens" (1973: 20).
According to the principle of output legitimacy, the political system at the European level should be ordered with
a view to maximizing system capacity. This principle does not exclude any of the standpoints on the legitimate
order at the European level a priori. Competences should be allocated to the level of policy-making which is most
effectively and efficiently capable of achieving the citizens' goals and to solve their problems. Legitimate
European rule requires that the European "system capacity" is higher than the capacity of the individual states.
3.1.2. Input Legitimacy
"Input legitimacy" subsumes all backings which base the legitimacy of a democratic system on the features of its
political process. Dahl (1989: 109ff.) lists five criteria which must be fulfilled: effective participation of the
citizens, voting equality at the decisive stage, an enlightened understanding of the matters to be decided, citizen
control of the agenda, and inclusion of all adults subject to the binding collective decisions of the association.
(b2) Legitimate rule must be based on the equal civil and political rights of all individual citizens.
(b3) Legitimate rule requires that the governors be directly empowered and held accountable by the citizens.
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(b4) Legitimate rule requires that the powers be divided and that the executive power be checked and balanced.
In contrast with "output legitimacy", the principle of input legitimacy claims that a democratic system of rule
achieves its legitimacy by the way decisions are made (and not by the results these decisions produce).
Nevertheless, it is assumed that only "government by the people" will ensure "government for the people". The
theory of input legitimacy is based on individualism: The equal autonomy and rights as well as the equal and
effective participation of individual citizens are the ultimate reference points for the legitimacy of a political
order. In the field of international relations, input legitimacy is best expressed in cosmopolitanism.
Cosmopolitanism regards the individual as the fundamental subject and bearer of rights in international politics -
no matter which social group she belongs to or which state's citizen he is.
According to the principle of input legitimacy, legitimate rule at the European level must ultimately be based on
individualism. As to the distribution of competences between levels, the supreme authority should be allocated to
the level at which the citizens' political equality, their participation in, and control of, political decisions is most
effectively ensured.
3.1.3. Social Legitimacy
"Social legitimacy" (Weiler 1991) encompasses those backings which consider the legitimacy of different forms
of democratic rule to be dependent in one way or another on the social context in which a political system
operates. Important social characteristics in this regard are the degree of social homogeneity, the collective
identity of the individuals and the strength of civil society. "Social homogeneity" refers to the objective social
structure, "collective identity" to the intersubjective social structure, and "civil society" to the actors and
processes required for individualistic democracy to work.
(b5) Legitimate rule depends on the strength of civil society. Individualistic, majoritarian democracy requires a
well-organized civil society. In its absence, the subjects of democracy are those collectives which possess a strong
internal civil society.
(b6) Legitimate rule depends on social homogeneity. Individualistic, majoritarian democracy requires a high
degree of homogeneity. In heterogeneous societies, the subjects of democracy are the homogeneous collectives.
(b7) Legitimate rule depends on collective identity. Individualistic, majoritarian democracy requires a
sustainable collective identity. In societies with fragmented identities, the subjects of democracy are the
collectives towards which the identity of the citizens is primarily oriented.
"Social legitimacy" is emphasized by the communitarian theory of legitimate rule. As a descriptive social theory,
it gives the "community" analytical priority over the individual. According to "input legitimacy", social groups
and the society have no subject status of their own. They are but the associations and aggregates of autonomous
individuals, and they are legitimate insofar as they mirror the interests of the individuals they are composed of.
According to "social legitimacy", however, individuals are not regarded as atomistic constituents of society. They
are born and socialized into communities from which they acquire their values and normative orientations and
towards which they develop a sense of belonging, a we-feeling, or collective identity. Soceties are not politically
integrated by the utility of cooperative arrangements for rationally calculating individuals (alone), but are (also)
based on "sentiment, solidarity and a degree of political cohesion" (Laffan 1996: 95; cf. also Kielmansegg 1996:
50).
Democracy, then, is not a form of rule that can be established within any association of individuals.
Communitarians interpret democracy as "government by the people". In their view, the "sovereignty of the
people" indicates the necessary existence of a pre-political, pre-constitutional entity, a community regarding itself
as "the people". This community creates a polity ordered according to its common values and norms: "It is not the
constitution which defines the people; rather, the constitution is legitimized by the self-definition, articulated in
the constitutional act, of a collective of citizens as the people" (Kielmansegg 1996: 54).
TAP 27
http://www.uni-tuebingen.de/uni/spi/taps/tap27.htm (14 von 33) [27.03.2000 15:13:58]
As a normative social theory, communitarianism attributes subject status and autonomous rights to the
communities. Insofar as they are the focus of the collective identity and of the social life of their members, they
deserve to be protected, e.g. by minority rights or by the principle of non-intervention in international law. One
strand of communitarianism regards social legitimacy as a sufficient condition of legitimate rule. In this case, any
shared values and norms as well as collective identities constitute a community which has the right to be
protected. In this relativist perspective, an Islamic theocracy is no less legitimate than Western-style democracy.
However, the strand of (democratic) communitarianism which is relevant in the debate on legitimate rule in the
European Union, considers social legitimacy to be a necessary precondition for input and output legitimacy to
obtain. In this view, not any community has the right to be protected. It is the democratic community to which the
individual feels attached and within which he or she is able to participate effectively in the democratic
process.[Endnote 18]
It follows from the principle of social legitimacy that the political order at the European level must protect the
communities (by consensual decision-making) to which the collective identities of the individuals are oriented
and which possess the best social prerequisites for stable democracy. At the same time, these collectives ought to
retain a maximum of political autonomy.
3.2. Arguments about the Legitimate Order at the European Level
3.2.1. Arguments for Conservatism
(s1) The legitimate democratic order at the European level ought to be based on consensual interstate
decision-making,
(a1) because the civil society is nationally organized (b5);
(a2) because European societies are very heterogeneous (b6); and
(a3) because the collective identities in Europe are predominantly national (b7).
Conservatism is clearly based on social legitimacy. The central argument for conservatism in the debate on the
democracy deficit is the dominance of national collective identities in the European system.[Endnote 19]
According to this argument, a stable (individualistic) democracy presupposes the existence of a collective identity
if people are to be subjected to majoritarian decision-making. Collective identities are built and stabilized in
"communities of communication, experience and memory" (Kielmansegg 1994: 27). They require "the absence of
deep ethnic, linguistic, religious, ideological or economic divisions" and the presence of solidarity and value
consensus (Scharpf 1992: 296). Such a community does not exist at the European level (or only to a very limited
extent). The multilingual structure of the European system severely limits communication, information and
participation (Grimm 1992: 59). There is no European public, no European civil society composed of
transnational organizations of interest aggregation. Instead, the European level is "characterized by the absence of
genuine European political parties and European media" (Neunreither 1994: 300). Ethnic, economic, cultural and
linguisitic heterogeneity is much higher than in working multinational democracies (Kielmansegg 1996: 55f.;
Scharpf 1992: 296). The collective memory is fragmented into national histories (Kielmansegg 1996: 56).
Therefore, a European collective identity, which would take precedence over national or regional allegiances and
provide Europe-wide decisions with "social legitimacy", did not develop. Consequently, a liberal parliamentary
democracy with individual representation and majoritarian decision-making will not work at the European level.
European policy-making must be subject to a consensus between national governments which are democratically
legitimated by their national constituencies and accountable to national parliaments.
Kielmansegg (1996: 60ff.) also opposes the representation of the nation by directly elected senators or members
of national parliaments. He suspects that a group of representatives for each country would hardly be able to reach
consensus about the national position to be defended at the European level and, thus, to pursue the national
interest as effectively as representatives of the executive branch of a national government.
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3.2.2. Arguments for Collectivistic Reform
Less Consensus
(s2) The democratic order at the European level ought to be based more strongly on majoritarian
decision-making,
(a4) because majoritarian decision-making is more effective and efficient than the current, predominantly
consensual mode (b1).
Proposals for the expansion of majoritarian decision-making at the European level are invariably justified by
considerations of effectiveness and/or efficiency. Even conservative authors concede the validity of this claim - if
not the priority of the backing to social legitimacy considerations (Kielmansegg 1994: 30, 32; Scharpf 1992:
297f.; Weiler 1991: 413). The same argument is sometimes used against the expansion of parliamentary
participation either at the national or at the European level: Boyce (1993: 471) and Scharpf (1992: 298) criticize
the proposal to enhance the legitimacy of European decisions by strengthening the role of national parliaments as
being inefficient; Neunreither regards the direct involvement of national parliaments in European policy-making
as counter-productive and leading to confusion (1994: 313).
Less Mediation
(s3) The democratic order at the European level ought to be based on more direct forms of popular
representation,
(a5) because the executive representatives of national governments are not elected in European elections and not
accountable to the governed for their European decisions (b3); and
(a6) because they mix legislative and executive functions (b4).
Proposals for less mediation in European policy-making are usually backed by the argument that the direct
empowerment and the direct control of popular representatives is more democratic than indirect, mediated forms
(Teutemann 1992: 20; Zürn 1996: 50). This argument is based on such fundamental democratic principles as
accountability and the sovereignty of the people. Witte (1995: 50) and Evers (1994: 128f.) further criticize the
concentration of power with the national bureaucracies: National executives are the legislators at the European
level, and the European bureaucracy is not effectively controlled by any representative body.
Less Aggregation
Regionalization:
(s4) The democratic order at the European level ought to be based more strongly on regional representation,
(a7) because the regional level is closer to the citizens and thus enhances their opportunities to participate in,
and exercise control over, political decisions (b3); and
(a8) because citizens possess a strong regional identity (b7).
Boyce (1993: 473f.) justifies regionalization as reducing the distance between the electors and the elected and
thus improving accountability. Weiler (1991: 417) also mentions this backing as a prime motivation for
regionalization. Regional identities are referred to, for instance, by Matláry (1995: 114).
Functionalization:
(s5) The democratic order at the European level ought to be based more strongly on functional representation,
(a9) because functional organizations contribute to the efficiency of European policy-making (b1);
(a10) because functional organizations would contribute to societal representation and governmental
accountability in the EU (b3);
(a11) because functional organizations would balance the executive dominance in the EU (b4);
(a12) because European civil society is most developed with regard to the economy and related fields (b5); and
(a13) because the EU is most homogeneous in the economic area (b6).
Proponents of functionalization draw on all theories of legitimacy in support of their position. Evers (1994: 127)
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infers his demand for corporate representation from his observation that the European Union is primarily an
economic community. Zellentin (1993: 44) stresses the functional character of the European Union and denies its
(current or future) statehood. I interpret a12 and a13 as being based on a backing which is very similar to the
concept of social legitimacy used by proponents of conservatism. If European homogeneity is greatest in the
economic sphere largely defined (Kluth 1995: 57), and if the European civil society is primarily a "bourgeois" or
an expert society, economic actors and interest groups can be considered the most adequate subjects of democracy
in this community. Or, in the more moderate version of a "third way" between conservatism and parliamentarism:
If the lack of social legitimacy, a weak party system and a weakly developed European public prevent a
full-fledged parliamentary democracy at the European level, a system of functional participation and
representation with interest groups, social movements, and public interest NGOs will most effectively serve to
mitigate the problems of representation and accountability in the European Union and can serve as a functional
equivalent to parliaments in aggregating interests, checking the work of the executives and enhancing the
transparency of European policy-making (Andersen/Burns 1996: 245f.; Andersen/Eliassen 1996b: 55; Zürn 1996:
51).
Moreover, parliamentary governance is regarded as increasingly ineffective by some of the proponents of
functionalization: "Although parliamentary institutions are the core of Western political systems, they are
undergoing systematic erosion. Modern governance is increasingly divided into semi-autonomous, specialized
segments or sectors; that is, it is multi-polar with the interpenetration of state agencies and agents of civil society"
(Andersen/Burns 1996: 227f.). In the highly complex Western societies, these "new forms of governance are
more technically effective and flexible than the forms of representative democracy" (231).
3.2.3. Arguments for Individualistic Reform
Parliamentarization
(s6) The democratic order at the European level ought to be based more strongly on parliamentarism,
(a14) because parliamentary rule is more effective and efficient than direct democracy (b1);
(a15) because a parliamentarization of the EU would guarantee the political equality and individual rights of the
citizens (b2);
(a16) because the EP is the only body in the EU system which represents the citizens of the EU and is legitimated
by direct elections (b3);
(a17) because the EP has too little power vis-à-vis the national and supranational bureaucracies in the European
multi-level system (b4);
(a18) because a parliamentarization of the EU would strengthen European civil society (b5);
(a19) because the homogeneity of the Europeans is sufficiently high to sustain parliamentary democracy at the
European level (b6); and
(a20) because a parliamentarization of the EU would enhance the European identity of its citizens (b7).
The claim of parliamentarization is based on all backings relevant in the academic debate. The main arguments
for parliamentarization are the same as in national political systems: (a) Parliamentarization would make
European policy-making democratically accountable and subject to popular participation;[Endnote 20] and (b):
Parliamentarization would secure and emphasize equal individual rights (Matláry 1995: 116; Petersmann 1991:
255) and optimize the "pursuit of individual goals" at the European level (Witte 1995: 128).
However, the proponents of parliamentarization do not altogether disregard the conservative preoccupation with
social legitimacy. For those who base their argument on economic theory and its "methodological individualism",
"collective identity" is usually no issue at all (Teutemann 1992, Witte 1995). But Kirchner and Schwartze (1995:
188f.) emphasize at least the requirement of a European public and party system: From the perspective of agency
theory, the principals (or individual citizens) will not be able to check their (parliamentary) agents as effectively
as in the national political systems if these features of a civil society do not exist.[Endnote 21]
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Classen (1994) and Kluth (1995) challenge the conservative argument directly. They try to demonstrate that
parliamentarization does not require the existence of a single, united people. In Classen's opinion, it is sufficient
legitimation that the European Community is a popularly approved association of the European peoples (247).
Kluth (1995: 42f., 66) understands democracy as government by the "totality of the active citizens" and thus
considers "democracy without a people" to be possible. Furthermore, they argue that the common historical and
cultural heritage, the objective necessity of effective cooperation, and the degree of homogeneity in the areas
regulated by the European Union are strong enough to make majoritarian parliamentarism at the European level
work. And real-world examples of multilingual democracies are supposed to show that a common language is no
conditio sine qua non of a working democracy (Classen 1994: 255ff.; Kluth 1995: 59ff.).
Proponents of parliamentarization are ready to concede that the European public, the associations of a European
civil society and European parties are as yet weakly organized. In their opinion, however, further
parliamentarization and integration will in turn create a European democratic infrastructure and contribute to shift
the loyalties of the Europeans to the European Union. The "very important function of the European Parliament to
establish links with the citizens will only develop substantially when it gets more powers and when it becomes
[...] a major decision-maker of the European Union" (Neunreither 1994: 302; cf. also Bieber 1991: 177). A
European public will develop as soon as the citizens possess real influence on European politics (Gerhards 1993:
108).
Among the different models of parliamentarization, a unitarian preference is usually justified by the principle of
(individual) equality (see a15(b2) above; Huber 1992: 363; Steffani 1995: 38). Proponents of a federal
parliamentary system criticize that "individual equality" presupposes the existence of one people, and in the
absence of a single European people must be combined with international proportionality (Bieber 1991: 168ff.;
Classen 1994: 248; Preuß 1995: 64). They further justify their preference for a federal system with the
heterogeneity and complexity of the European multi-level system (Europäische Strukturkommission 1994: 38;
Preuß 1995: 67f.) and with the absence of a coherent civil society, a common political culture, and a collective
identity (Europäische Strukturkommission 1994: 39; Wieland 1991: 446). The federalist arguments thus represent
a compromise between communtarian and cosmopolitan arguments.
Finally, how is parliamentary democracy at the European level justified in contrast to functional or direct
democracy? As far as functional democracy is concerned, the debate reproduces many of the arguments put
forward in the debate on pluralism and interest groups in domestic politics: Functional democracy privileges
well-endowed and highly organized groups and leads to a fragmentation and disintegration of the polity, whereas
parliamentary democracy secures the equal rights of the citizens, integrates the society, and is able to articulate
the common interest and pursue the common good. Therefore, even the most outspoken proponents of a greater
role for functional representation regard a parliament as necessary in order to monitor and regulate the specialized
governance systems (Andersen/Burns 1996: 246ff.). As far as direct democracy is concerned, Witte (following
Buchanan) considers direct consensual rule to be the legitimate ideal but nevertheless prefers parliamentarization
because of the scarcity of time and other resources and the costs of participatory democracy - an argument based
on efficiency (1995: 129; see a14(b1)). Obviously, in the eyes of its proponents, parliamentarization covers the
middle ground between the extreme input orientation represented by "direct democracy" and the extreme output
orientation represented by "functional democracy".
Direct Democratization
(s7) The democratic order at the European level ought to be based more strongly on the direct participation of
citizens,
(a21) because direct democracy best implements the equal political rights of the citizens (b2);
(a22) because direct democracy maximizes the citzens' participation in, and control of, policy-making (b3); and
(a23) because Europe-wide direct democracy would enhance the European identity of its citizens (b7).
It is a standard argument for direct democracy as compared to representative democracy that it maximizes the
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participation in, and direct influence of the citizens on, political decisions. Its proponents emphasize the great
need for direct democracy at the European scale, because the European Parliament is even further removed from
its constituency than national parliaments (Erne 1995: 229; Gross 1995: 193). Petersmann (1991: 266) adds that
not only bureaucracies but also parliaments "often suffer from asymmetries in the organization, representation
and political influence of group interests". The proponents of argument a23 join the critics of parliamentarization
as far as the lacking European collective identity is concerned. However, they claim that direct democratic
procedures - like Europe-wide referenda which involve the individuals in European affairs and give them real
influence - do not require a pre-existing collective identity but rather help to create one in the process.[Endnote
22]
3.3. Arguments about the Distribution of Authority Between Levels
3.3.1. Arguments for Europeanization
(s8) Authority in the European multi-level system ought to be distributed more strongly in favor of the European
level,
(a24) because many political issues can be dealt with more effectively and efficiently at the European level than
at lower levels (b1);
(a25) because a centralized regulation improves equal opportunities and the equal treatment of all citizens (b2);
and
(a26) because a centralized provision of security would strengthen the identification of the European citizens with
the European Union (b7).
A further Europeanization of policy-making is basically justified by the Europeanization or even "globalization"
of political problems. If political regulation is to be effective at all, it must be done at the supranational level. In
other words, the level of regulation must be congruent with the scope of the problem and with the group of people
affected by it (Teutemann 1992: 21; Zürn 1996: 39). The members of the Europäische Strukturkommission infer
their demand for an enhanced role of the EU in the provision of external and internal security mainly from the
ineffectiveness of national regulation in an internal market with increased mobility and permeable internal
borders as well as from the "growing international responsibility" of the EU (1994: 18). However, they also
mention that a stronger police and defense would, in addition, serve to gain the confidence of the European
citizens (49).[Endnote 23]
Economists base their demand for centralization on theoretical approaches which can be subsumed under
"economic federalism" (Kirchner/Schwartze 1995: 186ff.). It is invariably justified by macroeconomic advantages
stemming from "economies of scale" or "scope", the reduction of transaction costs, and the internalization of
external effects (Teutemann 1992: 57ff.). Centralization and harmonization is required if public goods were
otherwise provided at suboptimal levels or if the decentralized competition between public authorities in an
integrated market would lead to a downward spiral in political regulation and a "race to the bottom" in social
security (Franzmeyer 1993: 69ff.; Sinn 1994: 164, 171, 176). Finally, Europeanization can be justified with the
principle of equality: Only centrally decided and implemented policies make sure that all European citizens are
treated equally (Pöhle 1993: 58).
3.3.2. Arguments for (Re-)Nationalization
(s9) Authority in the European multi-level system ought to be distributed more strongly in favor of the national
level,
(a27) because political issues are dealt with more efficiently at the national than at the European level (b1);
(a28) because the national level is closer to the citizens than the European level and thus enhances their
opportunities to participate in, and exercise control over, political decisions (b3);
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(a29) because decentralization serves as a check against the concentration of political power (b4);
(a2) because European societies are very heterogeneous (b6); and
(a3) because the collective identities in Europe are predominantly national (b7).
Most commonly, the nationalistic standpoint is justified by the same principle of (the dominant) collective
identity which is used to back the legitimacy of consensual interstate rule at the European level (Haungs 1993:
134). Since collective identities in Europe are predominantly national, the national level should also be the
dominant level of European policy-making and reserve the core competences for itself. It is small wonder,
therefore, that both standpoints are often linked (cf. Grimm 1992: 59). Scharpf (1994: 121) and the Europäische
Strukturkommission (1994: 32) think that a higher degree of political integration would not be compatible with
"the great diversity" of European nations. A related, but more general principle used to justify decentralization is
the degree of homogeneity. It is claimed that a system should be the more centralized, the more homogeneous it
is. Since Europe is, for instance, more heterogeneous than Germany, European federalism must be more
decentralized (Haungs 1993: 134).
A further backing for decentralization with a long tradition in the theory of democracy and federalism are its
postive effects on participation, accountability, and the division of powers.[Endnote 24] In the words of Weiler
(1991: 416f.), an "integrated polity will not be undemocratic but it will be, in terms of the ability of citizens to
influence policies affecting them, less democratic".
Finally, there is disagreement within the economists' camp with regard to the relative efficiency and desirability
of centralization and decentralization. In favor of decentralization, it is argued that positive (or political)
integration - in contrast to negative (or market) integration - limits the beneficial regulatory competition between
political units. Market failures are more efficiently detected and corrected, innovations are more easily
implemented in a decentralized system. The individuals' costs of signalling their preferences and of choosing the
exit option increase with the degree of centralization. Thus, a centralized system is supposed to lead to
inflexibility and to an often more inefficient provision of collective goods. And finally, high-level cooperation
and centralization is regarded as being motivated by the political self- interest of politicians and bureaucrats or by
rent-seeking interest groups, rather than by the general well-being.[Endnote 25]
In recent years, the principle of subsidiarity has been introduced to this inconclusive debate in order to determine
the right distribution of authority in multi-level systems. However, analysts of European affairs do not tire of
pointing out that "subsidiarity" can indeed mean a lot of things and serve many different interests (cf., e.g.
Jachtenfuchs 1992; Rhodes 1992). For some, the "real" measure for competitive success is efficiency: Witte
(1995: 133) operationalizes "subsidiarity" as a "rational" distribution of competences based upon objectively
testable criteria. This will not help much as long as there is so little agreement about the relative efficiency of
decentralization and centralization. For others, "subsidiarity" has a decentralizing bias, protective of the lower
level collectives. In this interpretation, all competences should rest with the lowest possible level until it can be
demonstrated that a transfer of authority to the higher level is necessary - and not just more efficient - in order to
achieve effective regulation. Kielmansegg (1994: 31) even requires this necessity to be "obvious". Therefore,
"subsidiarity" can be put forward by proponents of both further Europeanization and (re-)nationalization. Because
of this ambiguity, proponents of (re-)nationalization generally mistrust competitive principles of competence
allocation:
(s10) Authority in the European multi-level system ought to be distributed according to the principle of exclusive
allocation,
because (a30) exclusive allocation protects the national level from the erosion of its competences by the
European level (cf. s9).
The separation of competences is exclusively demanded by proponents of nationalization and justified by the
same arguments. It is commonly agreed here that only a clear separation of competences can protect the
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autonomy of the lower levels and their capacity to act effectively, whereas competition leads to uniformity
(Scharpf 1992: 302; 1994: 120f.).
3.4. Theories of Legitimacy and Standpoints
As a conclusion and summary to this chapter, the theories of legitimate rule introduced at its beginning, i.e.
output, input and social legitimacy, can now be linked in a general way to the standpoints described in the
previous chapter. However, only a part of the prescriptions for legitimate rule in the European Union follow
unambiguously from the theories of legitimacy. Some prescriptions are indeterminate or internally disputed.
Others are based on more than one theory of legitimacy. Standpoints reflecting a combination of input and output
legitimacy as well as standpoints derived from a combination of input and social legitimacy are very common in
the academic debate, whereas a combination of output and social legitimacy is hardly found in the literature (see
ch. 4.2. below). Table 3 gives an overview.
output
legitimacy
input/output
legitimacy
input
legitimacy input/social legitimacy
social
legitimacy
subject of
democracy
functional
organization
individual and
functional
organization
individual individual and nation nation
participation indirect
individual and
functional
representation
direct indirect (federalparliamentarization)
indirect
(executive
representation)
decision-making majoritarian majoritarian mostly
majoritarian double consent
consensual
between nations
degree of
centralization disputed disputed disputed indeterminate national
allocation of
competences competitive competitive indeterminate exclusive exclusive
Table 3: Theories of Legitimacy and Standpoints
(1) According to the theory of output legitimacy, the European multi-level system should be based on
(a) less consensus and more majoritarian decision-making (a4),
(b) indirect, representative policy-making rather than direct participation (a14),
(c) an important role for functional representation and participation (a9), and
(e) a competitive allocation of competences.
However, the theory of output legitimacy seems to be indifferent or indeterminate with regard to collectivistic vs.
individualistic democracy and individual vs. parliamentary or executive representation. At least, there are no
arguments in the debate that would allow to discriminate between these alternatives. Although there is agreement
about the criterion of competence allocation (relative effectiveness and efficiency), there is no clear consensus as
to the appropriate distribution of competences between levels. Proposals for both centralization and
decentralization are justified by efficiency gains (a5, a6).
(2) The theory of input legitimacy prescribes a European system with less mediation and aggregation (a7, a10,
a11). Input legitimacy is maximized in an individualistic and direct democracy (a21, a22). Although a
parliamentary democracy based on equal individual representation is more often demanded by proponents of
equal rights, individual participation and control (a15, a16, a17), it already represents an implicit or explicit
concession to efficiency and thus to output legitimacy (a14). For reasons of political equality, a unitary
parliament at the European level is preferred to federalist parliamentarization (a15). On the same grounds,
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functional democracy is rejected, although it enhances participation, representation, and transparency on the
whole. As to the mode of decision-making, the theory of input legitimacy is not completely determinate.
Proponents of this theory usually advocate majority voting based on equal individual rights and input
opportunities. Only Witte (referring to Buchanan) argues that a consensus between individuals would be
theoretically preferable. In this case, majority voting must be justified by efficiency gains. As to the degree of
centralization and the mode of competence allocation to policy-making levels, the theory of input legitimacy is
not sufficiently determinate either. Whereas decentralization enhances effective individual participation and
control (a28) and the division of powers (a29), centralization may protect and secure the equality of rights of the
European Union citizens as well as enhance their equal opportunities (a25).
(3) As stated above, majoritarian parliamentarism at the European level can already be regarded as a concession
of input legitimacy to efficiency considerations. However, the combination of output and input principles is most
obvious in the proposal to link functional representation in specialized policy-making systems with individual
representation in parliaments. Considerations of effectiveness, efficiency, and pragmatic representation and
participation balance the lack of individual equality in functional systems. In this combination, the indeterminacy
of input legitimacy with regard to the principle of competence allocation disappears in favor of "competition", but
the dispute on the degree of centralization cannot be solved.
(4) The theory of social legitimacy appears to be the least ambiguous. In the most widespread view, it requires a
European system with consensual, interstate democracy and a dominance of the national level of policy-making
to be secured by an exclusive and enumerated allocation of competences to the European level (a1, a2, a3).
However, it is sometimes disputed that national identities are generally stronger than regional ones (a8).
Moreover, proponents of functionalization consider the degree of homogeneity and the strength of civil society in
the economic sector to fulfil at least the social prerequisites of a limited, functional democracy at the European
level (a12, a13). Finally, most proponents of parliamentarization and direct democracy would concede the
connection of social legitimacy and interstate democracy from a static perspective. They argue, however, that
individualistic representation and centralized regulation will create the prerequisites of social legitimacy at the
European level once they are in place (a18, a19, a20, a23, a26).
(5) When the principles of input and social legitimacy are combined, both the individual and the nation are
regarded as legitimate subjects of multi-level democracy. The result is a mixed, federal system. In this mixed
system, federal parliamentarization represents the compromise between government by a unitary European
Parliament and government by state representatives alone, and the requirement of double consent, i.e. both by the
representatives of individuals and by the states' representatives is the most striking feature of its decision-making
system.[Endnote 26] While the degree of centralization cannot be clearly inferred from the combination of input
and social legitimacy, proponents of a mixed, federal system favor the mutually exclusive allocation of
competences to policy-making levels in order to stabilize the federal balance.
4. Suggestions for Further Debate and Research
In the analysis of argumentations, one can distinguish two intractable constellations:
In a controversial argumentation, the dissensus not only pertains to standpoints and arguments but also to
the principle b which backs up the arguments. In the absence of a commonly accepted backing, there is no
solution to the dissensus.
1.  
A special kind of controversy is the argumentative dilemma, which emerges when the same proponent
accepts the validity of two or more backings which lead to contradictory arguments and standpoints. This
constellation can be solved, if the proponent orders the backings with regard to priority. In general,
however, controversies and dilemmas have to be transformed into competitive argumentations in order to
be solved. In a competitive argumentation, all opponents recognize the same backing but advance opposite
2.  
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arguments based on it. Under these circumstances, the dissensus can be dissolved if one of the opponents
can give convincing evidence for his or her argument.
In the concluding chapter, I will identify one major controversy - the one between individualism and
communitarianism - and one major dilemma in the academic debate on legitimate rule in the EU - the one
between social legitimacy and output legitimacy. And I will suggest how these intractable constellations can be
transformed into competitive arguments and become the subject of social science research.
4.1. Controversy: Individualism vs. Communitarianism
Since the debate about the legitimate order of the European Union is based upon a general democratic consensus
of all participants, fundamental controversies are rather the exception, and not the rule. Most obviously, none
flatly denies the validity of the principles of input legitimacy. The proponents of output legitimacy do not
describe their standpoints as an alternative to input legitimacy, but rather consider effectiveness and efficiency to
be enhanced by an indirect, majoritarian democracy with the participation of functional organizations. Neither do
the proponents of social legitimacy oppose input legitimacy. They only contest the applicability of its principles
in the particular social context of the European Union, because this level is considered lacking the political
prerequisites that make individualistic democracy work at the national level. Likewise, many proponents of
individualistic democracy do not dispute the importance of homogeneity, collective identity, and civil society.
They simply do not regard the underdevelopment of these features in the European Union as a fundamental
obstacle to parliamentarization - at least of the federal kind - or even to direct democratization. Nevertheless,
there appears to be one deep controversy and one widespread dilemma in the debate.
The controversy is between the strictly individualistic adherents of input legitimacy, who reject the
communitarian principles of social legitimacy, and those contributors to the debate who either give priority to
social legitimacy or at least accept its relevance and validity. Incidentally, this controversy follows the
disciplinary lines between economics and political science. Basically, it is rooted in the differences between
individualism and communitarianism in philosophy and social theory. Economists base their claims about the
legitimate European order not only on a methodological but also on a deeply normative individualism, whereas
communtarianism attributes subject status and rights to collectives such as the nation. Indeed, the concept of
"social legitimacy" based on collective identities and political cultures seems to be so alien to economists that
they usually do not even mention and discuss it at all.
In order to solve a controversy, the argumentative constellation has to be transformed into "competition", i.e.
from a normative and philosophical to an empirical and pragmatic question. Since all participants in the debate
agree upon "liberal democracy" as the legitimate form of rule, this transformation is possible in principle. The
pertinent question then is: "What are the social prerequisites of (a stable individualistic and majoritarian) liberal
democracy (in a multi-national setting)?" In the order of increasing distance to pure individualism and input
legitimacy, four hypotheses - based on backings 2, 5, 6, and 7 - can be formulated as answers to this question:
"Democracy needs no other social prerequisites than an association of interdependent individuals with
equal civil and political rights." This is the pure cosmopolitan argument in its empirical form (b2).
1.  
"Democracy additionally requires intermediary or meso-institutions like a common public, a common
system of societal organizations, and a common party system." This hypothesis adds the civil society
requirement (b5). It is compatible with individualism, e.g., insofar as a common public can be seen as a
prerequisite for the individuals to have equal opportunities for making choices that are in their best interest
(cf. Dahl 1989: 112) or insofar as effective intermediary organizations are necessary to bridge the
principal-agent gap (cf. Kirchner/Schwartze 1995: 188f., see ch. 3.2.3. above). Thus, this hypothesis
indicates a possible area of agreement in the controversy.
2.  
"Democracy additionally requires a high degree of social homogeneity." In other words: The wider the
societal gaps in terms of cultural values and understandings, economic well-being, or social stratification,
3.  
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the more narrow the area of democratic compromise and consensus (b6). As a result, the liberal democratic
political system will come under severe stress if the cultural, economic, or social groups are not either
homogenized or given a status of their own in the decision-making system. This hypothesis goes beyond
the previous one because it claims that the common institutions of civil society will either not come into
existence in a heterogeneous context or will not be influential enough to bridge wide societal gaps.
However, it does not demand a collective (national) identity as a necessary prerequisite of democracy. This
seems to be the position of Habermas (1994: 643): "Democratic citizenship does not need to be rooted in
the national identity of a people; notwithstanding the plurality of different cultural lifestyles, it requires,
however, the socialization of all citizens in a common political culture." Nevertheless, the wording of
Habermas' statement shows that his position cannot be subsumed under individualism anymore.
"Democracy requires a collective identity." This last hypothesis requires more than homogeneity for
democracy to work. Whereas homogeneity makes it possible to say: "They are like us", collective identity
is expressed in the statement: "They are part of us". To some extent, collective identity can even replace
homogeneity: It creates solidarity across cultural, economic and social cleavages. It is assumed that without
a certain degree of collective identity and solidarity, majority decisions and redistributive measures will
hardly be accepted by the minority and by the losers in the redistribution process. Mistrust will prevail, and
the democratic system will be in high danger of breaking down.
4.  
If a controversy is transformed into competition, second-order debates are triggered, of course. The basic
questions is: "Which of these hypotheses is empirically corroborated?" Political scientists would point to the
comparative analysis of political systems in support of social legitimacy in its strong version. There certainly is a
widespread analytical consensus on two points:
(a) "Ethnicity is the most difficult type of cleavage for a democracy to manage", more difficult than class or
occupation, because it "taps cultural and symbolic issues - basic notions of identity and the self, of individual and
group worth" (Diamond/Plattner 1994: xviii; cf. also Horowitz 1994). As multi-ethnic democratic societies like
Canada or Belgium show, a common high esteem for democracy and the rule of law, i.e. a Habermasian
consensus about constitutional principles and political values, does not prevent the emergence of separatism and
the failure of centralized political institutions.
(b) follows from (a): If democracy is to remain stable in deeply divided societies, it must develop mechanisms for
the protection of, and power-sharing between, communities. There are two basic mechanisms: The associational
mechanism is "consociationalism" (Lijphart 1969). It means the common exercise of political authority by
consensus between the democratically elected community leaders. The dissociational mechanism is "federalism".
It means the separate, autonomous exercise of (a varying number of) political functions by the communities. Both
mechanisms can be combined, of course, as in the case of Switzerland.
It follows that individualistic democracy presupposes more than just civil and political rights. In negative terms, it
requires the absence of persistent social cleavages, especially when they are intersubjectively internalized through
socially constructed images and identities. In positive terms, it requires the social glue that is provided by a
collective identity based on shared values, understandings, and self-images. Once it is agreed that social
legitimacy is an essential prerequisite of individualistic democracy, there appears to be widespread consensus,
including the proponents of individualism and input legitimacy, that the characteristics of social legitimacy are
lacking in European society: European civil society is hardly developed, its associatios and institutions, e.g., the
media, grassroots movements, and parties, are nationally fragmented. Heterogeneity is much greater than even in
those Western societies, like Belgium and Canada, which currently face constitutional crises because of their
multi-ethnicity. Collective identities are predominantly national, not European. At this point, however, there
arises a dilemma between social and output legitimacy.
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4.2. Dilemma: Output Legitimacy vs. Social Legitimacy
The legitimacy dilemma between output legitimacy and social legitimacy (as a prequisite of input legitimacy) is
regularly brought up by political scientists in their contributions to the academic debate. It has long been
articulated and discussed in the literature on "size and democracy". In the words of Dahl and Tufte (1973: 138):
"No single type or size of unit is optimal for achieving the twin goals of citizen effectiveness and system capacity.
[...] Democratic goals conflict, and no single unit or kind of unit can best serve these goals." If citizen
participation and control were the only relevant goals, small-scale politics in the homogeneous setting of a strong
community would be optimal. However: "For to be truly effective, citizens must have political systems with the
capacity to deal with matters that citizens regard as important. This will often call for very large systems" (109).
The European legitimacy dilemma, too, is seen to result from the fact that the principles of output legitimacy and
social legitimacy cannot be honored simultaneously in the European multi-level system. As far as this dilemma
concerns legitimate rule at the European level, the lack of the requisite communitarian underpinnings for a
Europe-wide liberal democracy prevents "the only logical solution from a strict democratic point of view", i.e. "to
strengthen the EU Parliament at the expense of the member states" (Andersen/Eliassen 1996a: 10f.). According to
Kielmansegg (1994: 30), individualistic and majoritarian democracy "can provide democratic legitimacy only to a
very limited extent" in an association of national communities. On the other hand, consensual interstate rule is
becoming increasingly inadequate because effective and efficient European Union action requires majority
decisions.
As far as the dilemma concerns the distribution of authority between levels, Scharpf (1994: 121) considers the
economic integration in Western Europe to "create a political momentum whose immanent logic would
correspond to a far higher degree of political integration and unitarization than would be compatible with the
national diversity and autonomy requirements of the European countries". The dilemma is posed in a similar way
by Zürn (1996: 40) - "While the prerequisite of convergence recommends an extension of the spatial scope of
political regulation, the prerequisite of identity points in exactly the opposite direction." - and by Kohler-Koch
(1993: 129), according to whom the common market requires political regulation, but the political system of the
European Community lacks the capability of reconciling the requirements of effective collective action and
democratic legitimacy in the absence of a transnational, European solidarity and civil society.
This dilemma is solved differently depending on which principle takes precedence for the authors. Scharpf and
Kielmansegg give priority to social legitimacy. In their analysis, collective identity is the more fundamental
principle of legitimacy. Zürn considers congruence to be the primary objective and expects that collective identity
will follow in due course. As in the case of controversy, a non-voluntaristic solution to the dilemma requires its
transformation into "competition".
4.3. Competition
Two competitive argumentations - both are already present in the debate on legitimate European rule - have the
potential to solve the dilemma: the dispute about the rational distribution of competences between levels and the
dispute about the creation of Europe-wide social legitimacy.
Distribution of Competences Between Levels
The dispute about the rational distribution of competences between the levels of the European system is based on
the shared backing of output legitimacy. If it could be shown that a (re-)nationalization or, more generally,
decentralization of policy-making is the more effective and efficient way of satisfying the interests of European
citizens, the dilemma would disappear. Output legitimacy and social legitimacy would both demand a "Europe
des Patries". Only if political regulation at the European level indeed enhanced system capacity as defined by
Dahl and Tufte, the dilemma would persist.
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As of now, there is no consensus, not even among economists, about the most effective and efficient allocation of
regulatory competences between the state and the international level. Some of the competition may be decided by
issue-specific economic analysis. However, most of it extends to general claims about the comparative efficacy
and efficiency of centralized (authority) and decentralized (market) regulation. An inherent difficulty of this
dispute may be that neither of the arguments exclusively favors Europeanization or nationalization. Centralized
regulation may be more efficient at the global than at the European level; decentralized regulation may be more
efficient at the regional than at the national level. And if the degree of rational centralization depends on the issue
at hand, political regulation will have to be split between levels. Such a result, even if it was convincingly
established, would not solve the dilemma.
(2) The Creation of Social Legitimacy at the European Level
The most pervasive competitive argumentation in the debate about the legitimate European order concerns the
question whether the requirements of social legitimacy are fulfilled or fulfillable at the European level. If it could
be shown that homogeneity, collective identity, and civil society develop in sufficient quality as soon as real
power is transfered to a higher level of government and to a common parliament or the citizens of community, the
dilemma would disappear even if centralized regulation at the European level proved to be most effective and
efficient. In this case, both social and output legitimacy would call for a "Europe of Citizens".
This dispute requires to study processes of identity-building. So far, the evidence appears to be inconclusive:
(a) On the one hand, identities are no fixed parameters. They can change and they have changed in the course of
history. Historical experience to some extent supports the claim that collective identities follow effective common
institutions. According to the modern age model of nation-building, the community would have to be actually
experienced as a symbol of political identification and, in order to produce a transnational identity, it would have
to demonstrate that it provides better protection against external and internal threats and/or a better satisfaction of
individual needs than the state (cf. Bloom 1990: 61; Druckman 1994: 59ff.). Bloom (1990: 151) finds that, since
the citizens of the member states do not actually experience the EC sufficiently as an autonomous object of
political identification, the Community is not able to evoke a European identity. The promotion of European
symbols since the 1970s (flag, passport, driver's license, license plates etc.) cannot alone transform existing
national identities (cf. Christiansen 1995: 55f.). The greatest identification potential of the EU is sometimes seen
in the chance that the EU may better assert itself in the global economic-technological competition - an equivalent
to the territorial competition and military conflicts in the development of the nation- states - than the individual
European countries (cf. Bloom 1990: 152; Münch 1993: 18).
(b) On the other hand, collective identities possess considerable staying power. The optimistic view that an
increase in transnational communication and interactions - which is certainly facilitated by the institutions and
policies of the European Union - will inevitably reshape the boundaries of collective identities, can hardly be
found in the current literature. It is furthermore questionable whether the experience of the pre-democratic age of
modern history is still valid today. "Integration before identity" or "state-building before nation-building" was
possible then because state-building was the result of force exerted by a small ruling elite. If identity-building
from above seems to be anachronistic, identity-building from below is faced with great obstacles, too. It is by no
means clear whether European parliamentarization and direct democracy will enhance a European collective
identity or strengthen national identities and exacerbate inter-nation conflict. The experience with referenda on
European issues has been quite sobering. Whereever a referendum was hold, it did not strengthen European
identities but revealed that national identities are more entrenched in the population at large than in the elites.
Instead of generating "European discourses", they generated nationally fragmented discourses on the future of
national institutions.[Endnote 27] Finally, even if this perspective on identity-building was correct: How long
would it take for the prerequisites of a European social legitimacy to emerge? A decade or half a century? And
what would happen to the European Union in between? At any rate, "nation-building" at the European level
would be a very long-term process. It would require a "step-by-step solution which makes use of the interaction
between constitution-building and identity-building" (Kleges 1995: 54; cf. also Christiansen 1995: 60). And it
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would lead to the conclusion that inter-community consociationalism will, for the foreseeable future, remain the
adequate form of governance at the European level.
5. Endnotes
I thank Andreas Hasenclever, Volker Rittberger and Michael Zürn for their helpful comments on an earlier
version of this paper.
1.  
The only exceptions I have found are Kluth (1995: 95f.) and Wessels (1996: 63f.). Whereas Kluth claims
that the European system is equivalent to the member states' systems in terms of parliamentary
government, and that the differences between these systems are due to the federal character of the Union,
Wessels regards "the highly differentiated participation of a multitude of actors from several territorial
levels and functional groups" as a "new kind of democracy" which is particularly adequate, and stable, in
the large area of the EU.
2.  
The terminology used here is based on Toulmin's standard scheme of reasoning (cf. Toulmin/Rieke/Janik
1979) as simplified, e.g. by Öhlschläger (1979) and Shi-Xu (1992). The term "standpoint" is Shi-Xu's;
"argument" follows Öhlschläger's terminology; "backing" and "warrant" are used both by Toulmin and
Shi-Xu.
3.  
Cf. the "claims" and "counterclaims" collected and ordered by Dahl/Tufte (1973: 13ff.) at the beginning of
their book on "size and democracy". Many of these claims reappear in the European debate.
4.  
Nota bene: My goal is neither to pit individual authors against each other nor to criticize individual
contributions with regard to their internal logic, clarity, and consistency (although much could be said
about it). The aim is to develop a systematic classification, and for this purpose, the standpoints and
arguments of the authors are often reconstructed in an ideal-type way.
5.  
In using the term "functional" I follow Anderson's article about "whether any forms of functional
representation can be reconciled with basic democratic criteria of political design" (1977: 131).
6.  
According to his typology which is based on empirical observations, majoritarian democracies are at the
same time individualistic and centralized, consensus democracies are collectivistic and decentralized.
Conceptually, however, these dimensions are independent of each other: it is perfectly possible to conceive
of democracies in which the consensus of individuals is required or majority vote among collectives is
practiced.
7.  
The Luxembourg Accord of 1966 ended the French "policy of the empty" chair by conceding a right to
veto to any state - even when the Treaties provided for majority voting.
8.  
Cf., e.g., Christiansen (1995), Grimm (1992), Haungs (1993), Kielmansegg (1994, 1996), Lepsius (1991),
Scharpf (1992), Schauer (1992), Weiler (1991).
9.  
Bieber (1991); Boyce (1993: 473); Classen (1994); Matláry (1995: 116); Risse-Kappen (1996: 74);
Wieland (1991); Williams (1991); Witte (1995).
10.  
Most proponents of parliamentarization also demand a stronger parliamentary influence at the national
level and closer cooperation between parliaments at different levels (cf. Neunreither 1994: 303ff.; Williams
1991: 172f.).
11.  
Europäische Strukturkommission (1994: 40); Preuß (1995: 69f.); Weidenfeld (1995: 20 - he is a member of
the "Europäische Strukturkommission" quoted above); Wieland (1991: 455); Williams (1991: 171, 173).
12.  
The reason for using the plural form here is that Teutemann wants the EU to be subdivided into seven
functional communities, each with its own parliament. This is no collectivist plan, however, because the
individual citizen is the subject of democracy in each of these functional communities.
13.  
The more "national weighting" is demanded, the more the distinction between parliamentarism and14.  
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senatorial representation is blurred.
Europäische Strukturkommission (1994: 44); Huber (1992: 371); Preuß (1995: 70); Steffani (1995: 41);
Williams (1991: 173).
15.  
This standpoint is, by and large, shared by Franzmeyer (1993: 71ff.) and Sinn (1994: 164ff.). In a
functionalist manner, Teutemann even demands to transcend the borders of the EU in many of these areas.
16.  
Cf. Europäische Strukturkommission (1994: 23, 32); Grimm (1992: 59); Haungs (1993: 134); Kleger
(1995: 54); Lepsius (1991: 36); Petersmann (1991: 262; 1993: 421); Scharpf (1992: 302; 1994: 121ff.);
Schauer (1992: 9); Wieland (1991: 447).
17.  
Cf. Bienen/Rittberger/Wagner (1996) for a comparison of both communitarian strands in the context of the
debate on the democratization of the United Nations. For the purpose of this paper, I prefer not to juxtapose
"liberalism" and "communitarianism". Firstly, democratic communitarianism is complementary, rather than
contradictory, to political liberalism. Secondly, as Kymlicka shows, liberalism does account for "the
individual's membership in a community and a culture" in principle (1989: 1).
18.  
Bogdandy (1993: 222); Christiansen (1995: 53); Evers (1994: 127); Haungs (1993: 135); Kielmansegg
(1994: 27ff.; 1996: 54ff.); Neunreither (1994: 300, 312f.); Scharpf (1992: 296).
19.  
Huber (1992: 356); Kirchner/Schwartze (1995: 188); Matláry (1995: 116); Petersmann (1991: 255);
Risse-Kappen (1996: 74); Williams (1991: 155).
20.  
Agency theory deals with the problem of ensuring that agents (like governments or companies) act in the
interests of the principals (like voters or shareholders) - rather than in their own interest. It analyzes
"agency slack" and offers institutional designs to remove it.
21.  
Cf. Jacobs (1995: 246f.); Zürn (1996: 49f.); and less clearly Kleger (1995: 49f.).22.  
Although the authors would probably not take their statement as far as that, I deliberately inferred a26 from
it, because it can also be found in the general literature on identity formation (Bloom 1990: 61).
23.  
These and other arguments are listed by Bermann (1994: 340ff.); Bothe (1994: 24ff.); Dahl/Tufte (1973:
13ff.).
24.  
Cf. Behrens (1994: 89); Franzmeyer (1993: 69f.); Heinemann (1996); Kirchner/Schwartze (1995: 187,
195); Petersmann (1993: 421).
25.  
Again, the combination would ideally require a "double consensus". The less strict and most often proposed
"double majority" can only be justified by additionally introducing the "efficiency" criterion.
26.  
Cf. Meunier-Aitsahalia/Ross (1993). It is revealing that Zürn (1996: 49) proposes Europe-wide referenda
only for the least controversial issues. He would probably have excluded even the few referenda that have
taken place so far, because they involved constitutional issues.
27.  
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